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ABSTRACT
A study to examine the role of privatisation in providing the urban poor access
to essential social services was conducted in sixteen streets of Dar es Salaam
classified as low-income areas. The study employed Participatory Rapid Appraisal
(PRA) approach whereby information was collected in consultation with
population of sixteen administrative streets of Dar es Salaam over a period of
five months. A triangulation method whereby information from the same sample
area was collected using different techniques including household case study;
focus group discussions (FGD); key informant interviews and neighbourhood
observations was employed.
The study revealed that privatisation of delivery of solid waste collection services
implemented by the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC), has had minimal impact
in providing the low-income households of Dar es Salaam with refuse collection
services. A large proportion of low-income households residing in unplanned
areas of Dar es Salaam are not receiving the service and/or rely on informal
refuse management systems. Reliance on informal refuse management systems
in itself does not constitute a problem but rather it is the inability of the systems
to cope with the demands of the ever-increasing solid waste generation
characteristic of unplanned areas of Dar es Salaam.
The study identified a range of interrelated factors, which contribute to the
minimal impact of concession privatisation in providing urban poor of Dar es
Salaam with refuse collection and disposal services. The factors include lack of
delegation of direct rights and legal obligations to the purchaser who is the
service recipient; inadequate institutional and organisational capacity of both
the DCC and the concessionaire, as well as the inadequacy of the concession as
the preferred option for delivering refuse collection service to the urban poor.
The study makes such recommendations as: first, increased financial capacity of
local authorities by hiving off high yield and cost effective tax source from the
central government and transferring them to local government authorities.
Secondly, strengthening the role of lower tiers of DCC (wards and street
governments) in the management of solid waste management. Thirdly, improve
the policy frameworks by involving service recipient representative institutions
in decision making and implementation and explore workable pro poor policy
delivery options including establishment of a single chain of service delivery
system in which the households, informal service providers as well as formal
service providers are networked into different forms of partnerships.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The study was intended to answer the question: Does the privatisation of solid
waste collection service provide the urban poor of Tanzania access to this service?
This study was intended to answer this question and its goal was to discover the
conditions necessary for privatisation to provide urban poor of Tanzania access
to basic social services such as solid waste collection. Social services in this study
refer to services that are essential to a given society in line with agreed sets of
collective values (Gordon, 1979). Privatisation as used in this study refers to
transfer to the private sector institutions both profit and non-profit oriented of
any activities and functions that have traditionally been done by the public
sector institutions.
The research study area was Dar es Salaam, one of the fastest growing cities of
Africa. Sixteen streets were selected on purpose for the study. A street represents
the lowest political-administrative unit in Tanzania’s local government structure.
Secondary data obtained from the then Dar es Salaam City Commission
(DCC)provided entry point to the selection of the sixteen sample streets.
Qualitative methods were used to evaluate the extent to which privatisation
through contracting out provision of solid waste collection services has enabled
the urban poor of Dar es Salaam to access this service.
2.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Information gap exists in explaining the extent and conditions under which
privatisation can better deliver social services such as solid waste to the urban
poor. This is critical particularly at a time when governments of developing
countries are considering privatisation as a solution to the problems of solid
waste management. In this study, the urban poor are defined as those individuals
with inadequate and unsustainable access to income and other resources necessary
to meet basic needs including adequate access to food, potable water, health
facilities, educational opportunities, housing, time for community participation
and social integration (Frankenberger 1996; 4). Existing information on the
role of privatisation reveals experiences demonstrating the efficacy of the
approach as an alternative to direct government provision of such services as
solid waste management.  Indeed, qualitative studies (Post, 1999; Doan, 1998;
Lifset and Fernandez, 1998; Lee, 1997; Ohnesgoren, 1993; Walker, 1992; Bartone
et al, 1990) support the argument that privatisation has played a pivotal role in
improving delivery of social services in developing countries. These scholars
used various performance indicators including physical and financial access to
such services by populations previously denied such services. None of the studies
above has attempted to provide a systematic assessment of the impact of
privatisation on various socio-economic groups in the developing countries.
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The information gap is explicit in Tanzania where existing studies have focused
more on issues of efficiency and effectiveness of the privatisation option. Three
studies have attempted to provide systematic assessments on efficacy of
privatisation of solid waste collection services in Dar es Salaam but none has
evaluated the impact of privatisation of solid waste collection services in Dar es
Salaam on the various socio-economic groups specifically the urban poor. The
studies include JICA (1996) Study Team which evaluated the problems of solid
waste management in Dar es Salaam city and the potential of privatisation in
addressing the problems; the Majani (2000) study which evaluated the efficacy
of privatisation of solid waste management in Dar es Salaam in institutionalising
Environmental Planning and Management; and the ILO (2001) study which
evaluated the potential of privatisation of solid waste management in Dar es
Salaam in providing the urban youths with employment opportunities. The
problem with regard to privatisation of solid waste management by Dar es Salaam
City Council (DCC) is the absence of systematic assessment of the extent to
which the strategy has benefited the poor in terms of access to this service.
Neither have there been any attempts to systematically access the conditions
necessary for privatisation to extend the service to the urban poor in other parts
of Tanzania. Yet, the strategy is being sought and considered for replication by
other urban authorities in Tanzania. More private service providers are being
brought on board. At the time of the conduct of this study (January-June, 2001)
the Kinondoni municipal council had given concession to a total of 4,837-service
providers spread across its 17 wards (Kinondoni Municipal Council, 2001; 3).
2.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The overall objective of this study was to conduct an exploratory descriptive
assessment of the performance of concession privatisation adopted by the then
Dar es Salaam City Commission (DCC), in extending solid waste collection
service to the urban poor of Dar es Salaam. The study focused on those factors
that hindered or facilitated concession model of privatisation as a strategy for
providing the urban poor of Tanzania with solid waste collection services. The
specific objectives were:
(i) To explore the critical factors for privatisation to provide the urban poor
of Tanzania with solid waste collection services; and
(ii) To document the experiences of the privatisation of solid waste collection
services of the Dar es Salaam city as lessons for other local authorities and
researchers in other parts of Tanzania.
2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions included:
(i) To what extent has concession privatisation adopted by the Dar es Salaam
City Commission provided urban poor with solid waste collection service?
The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services
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(ii) What factors are responsible for the state of affairs?
(iii) What needs to be done to reinforce or abate those factors?
2.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES
The study was undertaken between mid February 2001 and mid July 2001 and
involved recruitment and training of research assistants and actual fieldwork.
Initial data analysis was done during debriefing sessions.
Four research assistants were recruited and trained on Participatory Learning
Action (PLA) tools as well as participatory data collection techniques. The training
included development of study questionnaire and PLA tools relevant for each
questionnaire.
The research field work was conducted using the Participatory Rapid Appraisal
approach whereby through participatory processes, massive information is
collected in consultation with population of the study area in a short period of
time. Participatory Learning Action tools were used to facilitate participation of
the respondents. These included free listing and ranking, matrix completion
and institutional and historical mapping.  The study employed a triangulation
method whereby information from the same sample area was collected using
different techniques including household case study; focus group discussions;
key informant interviews and street walkabouts/observations. Separate topic
guides were developed and used to lead the data collection exercise.
For purposes of data collection the research assistants were organised into two
teams of two persons each plus one coordinator. Each team worked in one
street per day. Data collection was done mostly in late afternoon from 3.00 p.m.
to 5.00 p.m. Some focus group discussions were held in the mornings depending
on the convenience of targeted groups. Subsequent mornings were used for
debriefing sessions involving all researchers. Debriefing sessions were mainly
used to identify gaps in collected data, gain initial insights as well as feedback
on workability of research tools.
The study was carried out in sixteen streets of the Dar es Salaam city, classified
as low-income areas (Table 1). Dar es Salaam city is one of the 25 administrative
structures in the decentralised system of government in Tanzania. It covers an
area of approximately 1350 square kilometres including eight islands and a
population of approximately 3 million people (JICA, 1996). The urban poor
who constitute more than 70 per cent of the total population of Dar es Salaam
are geographically distributed in the three administrative municipal councils.
These are subdivided into 38 administrative wards and 178 streets (Lugalla,
2000; DCC, 2001). The sampling frame included all 178 administrative streets
of the Dar es Salaam City Council. Lack of detailed information on the profile
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of each street with regard to various poverty indicators (basic services and utilities,
sanitation and proportion of unplanned dwellings and low income households)
necessitated the inclusion of all administrative streets into the study-sampling
frame. A sampling interval was calculated to enable random selection of study
streets (cluster). A total of 81 household case studies (51 women and 29 men)
were held. Moreover, 25 focus group discussions (of between 6-8 people each)
were held. Sixteen (16) neighbourhoods observations and key informant
interviews were conducted (Annex 1 a summary of distribution of field activities
and respondents by street).
Table 1: Profile of Study Streets
Street Ward District Area Population Population
ward  per ward  density per ward
(person/km2
*Barafu Mburahati Kinondoni n.a. n.a. n.a.
Baruti Kimara Kinondoni 1.6 26,059 16,287
*Madenge Buguruni Ilala n.a. n.a. n.a.
*Chiwanda Tandika Temeke n.a. n.a. n.a.
Gongolamboto Ukonga Ilala 42.2 73,141 1,733
Idrisa Magomeni Kinondoni 1.4 19,603 14,002
Kiburugwa Mbagala Temeke 26.0 115,758 4,452
Manzese Uzuri Manzese Kinondoni 3.5 91,560 26,160
Misheni Mbagala Kuu Temeke 3.2 50,622 15,819
Mogo Kipawa Ilala 10.1 70,890 7,019
*Msisiri Mwananyamala Kinondoni n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mtongani Kunduchi Kinondoni 53.6 38,785 724
Mwongozo Makaburini Kinondoni 11.1 67,908 6,118
*Vijibweni Vijibweni Temeke n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mkunduge Tandale Kinondoni 3.0 116,392 38,797
Yombo Vituka Yombo Temeke 17.1 51,782 3,028
Compiled by the author from various sources; JICA, 1996; ‘Table 1-9 Classification of the
Wards in the Study Area’ JICA Report, 1996, p.1-27); Dar es Salaam City Council, 2001, List
of Streets and Wards in Dar es Salaam City Council.
*Details on population per wards corresponding to these streets was not available.
2.4 BACKGROUND TO THE PRIVATISATION OF REFUSE COLLECTION SERVICES
IN TANZANIA
Prior to 1994, solid waste management in Dar es Salaam was a statutory
responsibility of the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC). The DCC through its
administrative machinery and budget had the responsibility of providing the
service in accordance with the urban master plan (Majani, 2000; Kironde, 1995).
The DCC responsibility of solid waste management was among between three
departments health, works and planning. Refuse collection services were placed
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under the Section of Preventive Services the health department. The Department
of Works was responsible for maintenance of the solid waste collection trucks
as well as the roads leading to the disposal sites or workshops. The Department
of Planning  was responsible for urban planning including setting aside land for
construction of refuse treatment and disposal facilities. This fragmentation
undermined the importance of solid waste management collection service
compared to other activities of the DCC. Because of the low priority attached to
it, the component had the smallest share of the total unit budget (JICA, 1996,
pp.6-51). Refuse collection and disposal services received only 18 per cent of
the total budget of health and social welfare unit (JICA, 1996, pp.1-26).
DCC performance in providing refuse collection service was good until early
1980s when the service collapsed all together. Evidence of the collapse included
low solid waste collection rates compared to waste generated. Between 1989
and 1996, only 5 per cent of the 1,400 tones of waste generated per day were
being collected (ILO, 2001; Majani, 2000, p.111; JICA 1996, p.6; SDP, 1994).
Another indicator for poor performance was the disproportionate growth of
the demand for refuse collection  on DCC budget. Until 1995, the DCC budget
for refuse collection was 20 times less than the actual amount needed to provide
the service at the appropriate level. For example, the DCC had only 20 trucks
and 1 skip truck when the actual requirement to meet the demand for refuse
collection was 200 trucks (Baruti et al, 1992; Coffey, 199).
The collapse of the solid waste management in 1995 was further indicated by
DCCs’ failure to extend the service to the growing unplanned areas of Dar es
Salaam. It should be noted that until 1995, refuse collection service of the DCC
was limited to planned areas only (Halla, 1997; Armstrong, 1988). While few
unplanned areas were obtaining the DCC refuse collection service through
informal connections, more than 2.0 million people residing in these areas were
left unserved (Majani, 2000, p.39; Misigaro, 1994).
The collapse of the refuse collection system in Dar es Salaam resulted in serious
problems of unhygenic conditions in the city. These included large amounts of
garbage dumped on open spaces, along streets and roads, at market places, and
in the age systems drain (Majani, 2000, p.41; Ntukula; Lugalla 1997; Halla
and Majani, 1999). Both the international donor community and the government
of Tanzania attributed the collapse to the weakness of the urban planning and
management system then in existence. Both the rigid standards and centralisation
of solid waste collection and the disposal responsibilities by the DCC hierarchy
were identified as major factors contributing to the collapse of the solid waste
management system in Dar es Salaam (Majani, 2000, p.31). Rigid standards
including lack of recognition of unplanned areas were considered outdated given
the fact that these unplanned areas accommodated more than 70 per cent of the
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population of Dar es Salaam. Against this background in 1992, the government
of Tanzania with the support of international development partners introduced
the Environmental Planning Management (EPM) as a framework for
coordination of private, public sector and community partnerships in urban
development planning and management including solid waste management
(Kombe 1997).
The EPM introduced working groups to work as consultative frameworks for
identification of priority environmental issues and solutions for addressing them.
The working group for solid waste management identified both the inadequate
funding and lack of community involvement in solid waste management as being
critical issues (Majani, 2002; p.41). The working group identified participation
of the private sector in solid waste management as the key solution to the
budgetary problems of DCC. Concession was identified as the appropriate form
of privatisation to be adopted by the Dar es Salaam City Council.
The working group developed Planning Frameworks for Solid Waste
Management Master Plan spelling out goals, targets and strategies for the
implementation of the privatisation of solid waste management in Dar es Salaam.
Technical support from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
assisted the working group in the development of the Planning Frameworks for
Solid Waste Management Master Plan (JICA, 1996, pp.6-49). As stated in the
planning frameworks, the goals of privatising refuse collection and disposal
services were to improve and sustain refuse collection and city cleaning services
through cost sharing with communities. Other objectives of the privatisation of
refuse collection services included providing equal access to refuse collection
and city cleaning services to all city residents regardless of their income. Cross
subsidisation was identified as the strategy for ensuring low-income groups had
access to the privatised refuse collection services.
To facilitate equal access to refuse collection services by all city residents, the
city was divided into four different service zones namely Urban Planned Areas
(UPA), Semi Urban Planned Areas (SUPA), Urban Unplanned Areas (UUA) and
Semi Urban Unplanned Areas (SUUA). The basis for classification of service
zones included income levels of its residents/service user, level of solid waste
generated per capita per day, conformity to town planning laws and the
availability of the basic services (JICA, 1996, pp.8-2). Responsibility for solid
waste provision for the four service zones was to be shared among the DCC and
other non-government organisations. These factors determined the type of service
and technology required for each service zone as well as the mode of financing
the service provided. The DCC assumed responsibility for direct service provision
in Urban Planned Areas specifically to government offices and buildings. Private
companies with relatively high institutional capacity (financial and human)
The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services
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resources were to cater for urban planned and high-income residential areas as
well as the central business area. The Planning Frameworks for solid waste
management remained silent on service providers for Unplanned Urban and
Semi Urban Unplanned areas.
A tariff structure that segmented service users into subsidised and non-subsidised
service areas was introduced. Highly subsidised collection fees were set for
relatively low-income users’ areas and market rates were set for high-income
areas.  Public financing without user- contribution was applied in government
offices/buildings areas. Private financing was applied in both high and medium
income residential areas as well as central business areas.
A phased approach was adopted in the implementation of privatisation of solid
waste management in Dar es Salaam. Phase one started in 1994 targeting selected
areas in central business (Urban Planned) and high-income semi planned urban
areas. Lessons from this phase were to inform the two subsequent phases. Phase
two was to extend the services to all central and high-income areas. Phase three
was to extend the service to low income areas (Semi Unplanned Urban Areas).
Contrary to the proposed phased approach, the second and third phases were
implemented prior to completion of the first phase. Their implementation
commenced at the time when experiences from the first phase were raising doubts
on the effectiveness of privatisation in addressing problems of solid waste
management in high-income as well as central business areas of Dar es Salaam.
2.5 LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Privatisation as used in this paper refers to transfer to private sector and civil
society organisations of activities and functions that have traditionally been
statutory responsibilities of public sector. The transfer can take different forms
including contracting out, concession and outright sale (divestiture) and
concession.
2.5.1 Contracting Out Model
Privatisation through contracting out involves a public institution paying a private
sector or civil society institution to carry out functions or provide services on its
behalf. The public institution that buys a service from private sector institutions
becomes a purchaser (principal), while the private sector institutions that provide
the service becomes a provider (agent). The model imposes rights and obligations
on both parties - the purchaser and the provider. However, the service recipient
who is intended to benefit from the purchaser-provider relationship has no direct
responsibility. The exclusion of beneficiary of a service under the purchaser and
provider relationship characteristic of contracting out owes its justification in
representative systems of government. In such systems, representatives exercise
the rights and obligations on behalf of service beneficiary, and their exclusion
8The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services
from direct contractual obligations does not deny them any responsibility. When
this model is applied to refuse collection and disposal services in Tanzania, the
assumption is, the DCC a body of elected officials acts on behalf of the service
recipient and hence it can purchase the service on their behalf.
The major strength of contracting out as a strategy for transferring responsibilities
to private and civil society institutions, relates to lowering transaction costs.
The competition among service providers for contracts from the purchaser
motivates the former and ensures the recipient of efficient working practices.
Consequently lower service production costs are achieved making the service
accessible to the poor (Chandler, 1996; p.42). Contracting out introduces
sustainable and cost effective forms of control in that, the contract rather than
command through the law becomes a tool for enforcing compliance/performance
(Boulding, 1990). Moreover, by delegating enforcement responsibility to those
who are engaged in actual execution of the contract, the strategy removes delays
associated with bureaucratic enforcements of contracts obtaining in governmental
structures (Dia, 1996).
The major weakness of contracting out relates to the demands it puts on the
purchaser. For contracting ,out  the purchaser needs to have relatively good
financial and organisational capacity to meet the contractual obligations. Equally
true, the service beneficiary needs to have a sense of duty and responsibility to
pay taxes that would enable the purchaser (government) meet its contractual
obligations.
Governments that are strong in terms of financial, institutional and organisational
capacities have adopted contracting out. These are mainly governments of
countries in the developed world including United the Kingdom and the United
States of America (UNESCAP, 2001; Majani, 2000). The model may, however,
be difficult to pursue in developing countries where governments are weak in
terms of revenue collection and also where the sense of duty on citizens is low
(JICA, 1998, pp.5-12).
2.5.2 Concession Model
Privatisation in the form of concession involves a public institution authorising
a private sector or civil society institution to deliver or perform the function on
its behalf. The authorising public institution does not pay the agent for the
service but rather passes on the responsibility to the service recipient or beneficiary.
Unlike in contracting out model where the public institution purchases or pays
the agent (service provider), under a concession model it is the service recipient
who pays the agent directly. In this arrangement the purchaser is the service
recipient and not the privatising public institution. Under the concession model
the service recipient (purchaser) has no direct rights and legal obligations like in
the contracting out model, because such rights had already been transferred to
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the public institution. Thus, just like in the contracting out model, the public
institution assumes full responsibility in determining the terms and conditions
under which the concessionaire will deliver the service and the purchaser will
pay for the service.
Transfer of refuse collection and disposal services in Dar es Salaam adopted a
concession model. In this case the DCC authorised the concessionaire to provide
solid waste collection and to collect requisite fees from designated communities.
The DCC roles included identifying and giving concessions, defining terms and
conditions of service including areas of service, period of time of concession, the
billing system and the quality of service. The DCC was also responsible for
providing enabling framework for the service provider to work including credit,
equipments, legislation, monitoring and law enforcement (JICA, 1998, pp.5-12).
Concession as a model for transferring government responsibility to private
sector and other non-governmental institutions is commonly experimented by
governments that are weak in terms of financial and institutional capacity. In
such countries privatisation is seen as a way of mobilising resources from the
private sector by government. This explains why privatisation in form of
concession has been the dominant approach adopted by financially and
organisationally weak governments of the developing countries of Africa such
as Tanzania (Majani, 2000).
Concession contract has weaknesses that tend to reduce its efficacy in providing
the poor with intended benefits. One major weakness of concession model, relates
to lack of delegation of direct rights and legal obligations to the beneficiary,
who unlike in the contracting out model is also the purchaser (Horton and
Farnham, 1999; p.85). This is a weakness because it denies the beneficiary who
is the purchaser of the service the opportunity to determine the terms and
conditions of service. It also does not give sense of self-regulation on the
beneficiaries but rather relies on the delegating authority to enforce concession
agreements. Self-regulation on the part of service beneficiary is critical for lowering
transaction costs. It is contended that the absence of delegation of direct legal
rights and obligations to the service recipient characteristic of concession
agreements, generates high contractual enforcement costs (transaction costs)
making the service inaccessible to the poor. Moreover, this lack of self-regulation
generates irrational behaviour on the part of urban poor consequently increasing
service provision costs of the provider (agent). This is because in principle the
beneficiary who is the purchaser is not part of the agreement. As such the
beneficiary does not feel obliged to respect the contract to which he is not a
party.
Another weakness relates to monopoly that the concession gives to the service
provider (agent). Under a concession agreement, the service provider is given
10
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sole rights to render service as well as collect service charges from service users
of designated concession area(s). The monopoly accorded to the service provider
limits service users’ freedom of choice necessary to stimulate competition and
consequently efficient working operations of service providers (Chandler, 1996,
p.42; Dia, 1996). Success stories of privatisation of delivery of services such as
health in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia are associated with efficiency gains
resulting from competitive prices offered to service users by competing private
companies (Dia, 1996; Smale and Ruttan, 1994, p. 2).
Critics of concession privatisation further contend that for concession
privatisation to deliver intended results it requires advanced level of institutional
capacity on the part of the concessionaire to meet contractual obligations
(Hirshmann, 1993). This requirement is hardly met in developing countries
especially those in Africa. Quite often the private sector is weak and evolving
thus finding it difficult to take active role in meeting contractual obligations
without the delegating authority’s (principal) support. This weakness forces
private sector to employ inefficient working operations, which tend to raise
transaction costs making the service inaccessible to the low-income populations.
Problems of weak institutional capacity in developing countries are also prevalent
in the delegating authority. The experience from developing countries, reveal
that quite often concessionaire contracts are implemented in situations of low
levels of institutional capacity on the part of principal (Christiansen, 1998; Cohen
1992; Luke, 1990). The resource base of local authorities who are in many
instances the delegating authority is too weak to enable them provide enabling
framework necessary for efficient working of concessionaires (Gary and
McCubbins, 1996). Cited cases of weak resource base include absence of
incentives to stir up competition among service providers, and lack of monitoring
and evaluation strategies (World Bank, 1997).
Other factors limiting the potential of concession privatisation in developing
countries relate to their internal organisational configuration. Governments in
developing countries though subscribing to decentralisation ideals remain
centralised in practice. This centralisation places responsibilities for enforcement
of contractual obligations at higher levels of government hierarchy. This reduces
governments’ (principal) ability to enforce contractual obligations critical for
service provider to secure compliance of service users. The successes of contracting
out health care delivery in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia is associated with
appropriate organisational structures and programme design emanating from
delegation of staff, budget and information to lower levels of local authorities
(Dia, 1996). The importance of a strong information base at the service delivery
point is underscored by the experiences of contracting out infrastructural project
in Senegal. It is argued that a strong information management system enabled
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the contracting authority to monitor and evaluate accordingly the performance
of AGETIP in Senegal (Dia, 1996).
The argument for devolution of budget and enforcement responsibilities to lower
levels of contracting authority as a critical condition for success of concessionaire
method of privatisation, need to be extended to include the purchaser. Under a
concession arrangement, the service user is the purchaser because s/he pays directly
to the provider. Experience shows that quite often the organisational structures
of privatising authorities do not provide opportunity for direct involvement of
the purchaser in determining terms and conditions of service. Exclusionary
structures have resulted into formation of strategies, which are flawed in design,
and do not address the concerns of the purchaser. Cited are cases of local
authorities setting collection fees without knowledge of residents needs and the
type of responses which are required to meet their needs appropriately and
comprehensively (Brown, 1992). Also cited are cases of local authorities setting
entry standards for providers without proper knowledge on their socio-economic
backgrounds.
The suggestion that a concession form of privatisation is appropriate for weak
government systems is a flawed one because experience shows that for it to
work it requires a sound resource base on the part of government. Weak financial
base has been cited as the major cause of poor performance of the concession
method. To the contrary, contracting out of public service delivery in developing
countries has been implemented in situation of inadequate resources on the part
of government. For a concession method to address problems of delivery of
service to the poor, financial resources in form of subsidy are critical (Preker and
Feachem, 1995).  Evidence from other countries underscore the importance of
incentives such as subsidies in inducing desired behaviour on the part of service
providers. Cases are cited of subsidies being offered to service providers focusing
on low-income areas where residents’ ability to pay full cost for the service is
low. In South Africa for example, subsidies have been provided to service
providers in Soweto (Dia, 1996).
2.5.3 Outright Sale
Privatisation by outright sale refers to the process whereby a public institution
sales its assets (movable and immovable) to a private sector or civil society
institution. The public sector pursuing privatisation retains the role of enabler
and regulator, and arbiter of other actors including government, private sector
and civil society involved in the process (UNESCAP, 2001).
2.6 PRIVATISATION OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN DAR ES SALAAM
Privatisation of solid waste collection services in Dar es Salaam has taken the
form of concession. In this case the private service provider referred to by the
DCC as a contractor has been given monopoly to render service in a particular
12
The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services
area and to collect service charge from the solid waste generators on behalf of
the DCC (Majani, 2000, p.114; JICA, 1996, pp.6-44). Thus the service provider
assumes the role of an agent and the Dar es Salaam city authority becomes the
principal. The role of the principal under concession privatisation is to provide
an enabling framework including passing by laws that compel service users to
pay for refuse collection services. The role include enforcing by laws through
monitoring performance of service providers and the strategy as a whole as well
as to provide incentives necessary for agents to fulfil their contractual obligations.
Based on the literature review, the analysis will focus on the extent to which the
weaknesses of the concession form of privatisation contributed to the poor
performance of the strategy in providing the urban poor of Dar es Salaam with
refuse collection and disposal services.
3.0 ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
3.1 THE POVERTY PHENOMENON OF THE STUDY AREAS
The presentation of data on the poverty status of the sixteen study streets lends
support to the secondary data, which characterise these streets as low-income
areas. The research findings further show that, the impact of poverty is not
evenly distributed in the sixteen streets and also between men and women.
As was indicated in the methodology, the sixteen streets sampled for the
assessment were those streets classified as low-income areas by the Dar es Salaam
City Council. Indicators used in the secondary data to classify the streets as low-
income areas included: congestion or overcrowding of people per room,
congestion of houses per square kilometre, poor sanitation depicted by higher
ratio of people per latrine, blocked drains, filthy environment with overflowing
pit latrines and poor housing (building materials: grass thatched roofs, mud
floor and poor or no ventilation).
Validation of poverty status of the sixteen streets involved observation of visible
poverty indicators through guided walkabouts. Results of the qualitative
assessment of the sixteen assessment streets reveal that with the exception of one
street (Mogo), the remaining fifteen streets are low-income areas as they exhibit
characteristics of low-income areas as classified in secondary data obtained from
the DCC. All the fifteen streets are unplanned with high population density per
room; have high house density per square kilometer leaving no space between
houses. Overflowing pit latrines, no or blocked drains were observed in all the
sixteen streets (Table 2). Three streets Idrisa, Uzuri and Mkunduge are worse
when compared to other streets. A quote from Mkunduge one of the most
vulnerable streets expresses this better “Huu sio mtaa wa kuishi ni kiyama”
[This is no place to live in but hell] (see pictures 1,2, and 3 in exhibit 1).
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EXHIBIT 1:
Picture 1: Solid waste dumped in River N’gombe in Mkunduge Street
Picture 2: Solid waste stock piled behind residential houses in Mkunduge
14
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Picture 3: Solid waste dumped close to residential houses in Mkunduge
The significance of habitat related factors relate to the influence they have on
access (physical and financial) to solid waste collection services by the low-
income groups. Unsanitary conditions generate water and airborne diseases.
These tend to compromise health security of the residents and consequently
their participation in livelihoods earning activities. Outbreak of cholera and
communicable diseases was cited as one of the major consequences of uncollected
solid waste in more than eight of the assessed streets.
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Table 2: Summary Poverty Indicators of the Sixteen Streets
Street Housing Living Cleanliness Population Building
Environ/ Density Congestion
Sanitation per Room
hgiHhgiHrooProoPufaraB
Baruti Poor (Concrete plastering Poor Filthy High High
but dilapidated; pole roofed stinking (6 persons)
leaking roofs; Toilet
temporary high density
30-35 persons per pit
Buguruni Very Poor (More than 60% Very poor Filthy High High
Madenge of houses mud walls, box stinking (6 persons)
roofs)
Chiwanda- Poor roofing iron sheets Poor Unclean High High
Tandika dilapidated; Mud floor
Toilet density high
(28 people per pit)
hgiHylhgiHnaelCoNrooPotobmalognoG
drainage congested
hgiHhgiHyhtliFrooProoPasirdI
hgiHhgiHrooProoPawgurubiK
Manzese Uzuri Very Poor Very Poor Filthy Extremely High
stinking High
(9 Person)
hgiHrooProoPinehsiM
Mogo Poor (More than 80% of Poor Okay Extremely High
houses mud walls, box High
)snosrep 8(ta ytisned pop hgiH ;sfoor
least 35,000 people; 1280
houses; each house more
than 7 households and
each h/h 8 persons
Msisiri Mixed good for planned
areas/poor unplanned areas
woLwoLdooGdooGinagnotM
hgiHhgiHdooGrooPozognowM
hgiHhgiHrooProoPinewbijiV
(6 persons)
Mkunduge Very Poor Very poor Filthy High High
stinking
Yombo vituka Poor (Congested area) Poor High High
Source: Compiled by the author from field data
3.1.1 Gendered Dimension of Poverty
Gender differences surfaced particularly in relation to vulnerability to poverty
and consequently access to solid waste collection services. Unreliable incomes,
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over crowding in rented rooms and large number of dependants
disproportionately affect women in all of the sixteen surveyed streets. For instance,
of the 51 women household case studies conducted, 45 (88 per cent) relied on
food vending (mama lishe) activities for their income. On the other hand only 5
(17 per cent) of the 29 men relied on food vending as major source of income.
Reliance on informal food vending activities in itself does not constitute a problem
but rather it is the generally below subsistence level incomes provided by this
type of livelihood activity. Experience shows that income from informal activities
is inadequate to cover shelter, education and health needs of its employees
(Lugalla, 2000; Malyamkono and Bagachwa 1992). Seasonality of livelihoods
earning activities of the informal sector also undermines its efficacy as a coping
strategy against income insecurity for the poor households in these streets. Quite
often food vending activities have had to stop during rainy seasons due to air
borne and water borne diseases (cholera) caused by unsanitary conditions
characteristic of these streets (Lugalla, 2000; Kaare, 1998; Kulaba, 1996).  The
data in this section shows that the proportion of medium and high income
households in these streets is quite low to make any impact in cross subsidising
services of low income households.
3.2 AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY OF SERVICE
To what extent does contracting out refuse collection services by the Dar es
Salaam City Commission provide poor households with the service?
This question intended to assess the impact (outcomes) of concession privatisation
by the DCC in providing the urban poor of Dar es Salaam with refuse collection
and disposal service. Different impact assessment indicators were developed from
secondary data to assess the status of refuse collection services and living
environment of the sixteen study streets (ILO, 2001; Majani, 2000; JICA, 1999;
Lugalla, 1996; Kironde, 1995; Kulaba, S., 1989; Ntukula, 1984). The indicators
included:
i) Availability (physical access) of concessionaire provided service in each of
the sixteen streets;
ii) Poor household dependence or non dependence on concessionaire provided
refuse collection and disposal service;
iii) Area improvement (i.e. status of waste piles; scattered solid waste) before
and after the interventions;
iv) Users perception on the performance of concessionaire provided refuse
collection service; and
v) Users perceptions on the quality of refuse collection service.
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Indicator 1:Availability (physical access) of concessionaire provided refuse
collection service in each of the sixteen streets.
This indicator intended to measure physical access to this service by the urban
poor. The study findings show that the urban poor of the assessed streets
experience difficulties in accessing the service because the service has been
inconsistent by either being present for a short while or never took off. As
exhibited in Table 3, concessionaire provided refuse collection service was short
lived in all but six streets (Chiwanda, Mogo, Gongo la Mboto, Madenge, Msisiri,
Mwongozo and Kimara Baruti). Densely populated streets such as Yombo Vituka,
Buguruni-Madenge, Barafu, Idrisa and Vijibweni were most affected by problems
of withdrawal of service providers. It is worth noting that the research findings
on availability of concessionaire provided refuse collection service in the sixteen
study areas contradict information from secondary data, which indicate existence
of concessionaires in all the sixteen streets.
In those streets where concessionaire provided refuse collection service is available,
the service is of poor quality, that is, unreliable/sporadic. With the exception of
Mogo and Kimara Baruti, the service has been and still is sporadic ranging from
once a week to once a month. In streets where service has been reliable like in
Kimara Baruti, it is limited to those who are willing to pay.
Table 3: Status of Availability of Concessionaire Refuse Collection Service in
the Sixteen Study Streets
Street Concessionaire Service Provider
Barafu-Mburahati was there for 2-3 months; withdrew because rejected by community
Kimara-Baruti CBO
Buguruni Madenge available but irregular
Chiwanda-Tandika was there but left
Gongolamboto available irregular
Idrisa was there but worked for less than six months
Kiburugwa operated for two weeks and withdrew
Manzese Uzuri available but irregular
Mogo CBO
Msisiri available for planned section,
Mtongani was there for three months only
Misheni was available withdrew after six months
Mwongozo-Makuburi available but irregular twice a week
Vijibweni service provider allocated but served for two months and withdrew
Mkunduge service provider allocated but rejected by community
Yombo vituka was there but left after one month
Source: Compiled by the author from triangulated field information
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Indicator 2: Poor household dependence or non dependence on concessionaire
provided refuse collection and disposal service
Assessment of poor household dependence on concessionaire provided refuse
collection and disposal service was another impact indicator used to measure
the effect of this strategy on poor urban households. With the exception of
Mogo, respondents in focus group discussions indicated heavy reliance on other
types/forms of refuse collection services (Table 3). As shown in Table 4, reliance
on concessionaire provided service was indicated in only one street, Mogo, while
the others indicated reliance on other service providers including: pushcarts,
viroba guys (men aged between 15-45 years old), dumping, burning and burying.
Even where concessionaire provided service was the dominant mode of refuse
disposal as in Mogo, other forms of refuse disposal including burning and
dumping compliment it.
Table 4: Type/form of Refuse Collection Service Commonly Used by
Households in each Street
lamrofnIerianoissecnoCteertS
Push carts Viroba guys Dumping Burning Burying
Barafu-Mburahati
Kimara-Baruti
Buguruni Madenge Open sewer
Chiwanda-Tandika
Gongo la Mboto
Idrisa
Kiburugwa
Manzese Uzuri
Misheni-Mbagala
Mogo
Msisiri
Mtongani
Mwongozo-
Makuburi
Vijibweni Open pit
Mkunduge
Yombo vituka Open
space;
neighbours
veranda
Source: Compiled by the author from field data
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Indicator 3: Area improvement (status of solid waste stocked piles and scattered
solid waste) before and after the interventions
This indicator intended to measure the change in the status of solid waste and
the general living environment (cleanliness) following the introduction of
concessionaire provided refuse collection service.
Three sub-indicators including visibility of scattered and uncollected waste piled
in open space/containers; perceptions of status of cleanliness before and after
the intervention were developed to measure the extent to which contracting out
refuse collection strategy has improved living conditions of the low-income
populations of Dar es Salaam. Street walkabouts, focus group discussions, key
informants interviews as well as household case studies were carried to map out
the before, after and present situations.
Information triangulated from these various research tools indicate that the status
of solid waste and living environment (cleanliness) has not changed for the better
following the introduction of concessionaire service. However, some improvement
has been observed in three streets (Gongo la Mboto, Mogo and Mtongani). The
recorded state of cleanliness in these three streets was not a result of concessionaire
service provider but rather a result of availability of other forms of refuse disposal
including burying and burning. A quote from key informant in Mogo lends
evidence to this assertion,“Huu usafi unaouona hapa siyo sana kazi ya UASU.
Nyingi za nyumba hizi wanatupa taka kwenye majalala ya kienyeji na wengine
wanachoma moto.” [UASU has not contributed much to the state of cleanliness
being observed in this street. Many of these houses dump the refuse in available
local dumping places and others burn them].
With regard to visibility of scattered and uncollected solid waste stocked in
piles, all streets with the exception of two, Mogo and Gongo la Mboto, had
problems of scattered solid waste, solid waste stoked in piles, waste dumped in
drains or water streams, filthy smell and dirty surroundings. There are variations
with regard to the extent of vulnerability to presence of scattered solid waste
and poor living environment in the fourteen streets. Densely populated and
overcrowded streets such as Kimara-Baruti, Idrisa, Kiburugwa, Manzese Uzuri,
Msisiri and Mkunduge are the worst affected. Table 5 provides summary
information obtained from neighbourhood observations of the sixteen streets.
The presence of scattered solid waste in the fourteen streets by itself does not
provide sufficient evidence of the dismal performance of concessionaire model
in improving living conditions of the low-income households. Other indicators
such as historical mapping of before and after the situation of the living
environment support this indicator (Figure 1 and Annex 2 for detailed summary
of historical mapping of all the 16 streets).
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Table 5: Neighbourhood Observation
Streets Visible Solid Dumping Standing Filthy Cleanliness
Scattered Waste Places  Water Smell Extremely
ytriD  seliP nietsaW diloS
Barafu-Mburahati
Kimara-Baruti
Buguruni Madenge
Chiwanda-Tandika
Gongo la Mboto
Idrisa
Kiburugwa
Manzese Uzuri
Misheni-Mbagala
Mogo
Msisiri
Mtongani
Mwongozo-Makuburi
Vijibweni
Mkunduge
Yombo vituka
Key: Extremely dirty refers to stinking smell from rubbish stocked in piles, overflowing sewage,
open drains blocked with rubbish
As noted in Figure 1, there has been little improvement in the status of cleanliness
of the fourteen streets after the introduction of the contracting out strategy.
Figure 1: Historical Mapping of State of Cleanliness of Selected Assessment
Streets
Scores 1 – 4, in Figure 1 represent clean, fairly clean, dirty and extremely dirty respectively.
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Indicator 4: Users perceptions on the usefulness and/or importance of
concessionaire provided refuse collection service.
This indicator was intended to gather communities’ perception on the importance
of refuse collection service. This measure is related to the impact assessment in
that it gives an indication on the value attached to the service as a response to a
priority risk.
The importance of refuse collection services to households’ well being was
measured through ranking. Respondents were asked to identify in order of
priority common risks to well being and livelihoods. Ranking of major risks to
livelihoods positioned scattered and uncollected waste as second major cause to
livelihoods risk (see Table 6). The respondents identified availability of refuse
collection service as an important service in response to a priority risk.
Respondents further demonstrated high level of understanding of the linkage
between the four risks presented in Table 6. The table shows that uncollected
and scattered solid waste ranked number two (B) in the matrix on community
common risks. Note that water ranked number one (A) because, lack of water is
a problem experienced by all the sixteen streets and their major form of access is
through purchase from water vendors. This linkage between uncollected solid
waste and health risks is better explained by a quote from women focus group
discussion in Mburahati Barafu, “Magonjwa hulipuka mara nyingi wakati wa
mvua kwa sababu maji husomba uchafu na harufu mbaya hutanda kote.”
[Outbreak of diseases occurs mainly during the rainy season because water carries
garbage and filthy smell spreads everywhere]. Scattered and uncollected solid
waste were considered major causes of waterborne and vector-borne diseases
experienced by them. Women in high entertainment streets (guest houses, bars
and restaurants) such as Baruti, Mkunduge and Uzuri were more concerned
with uncollected waste from bars and guest houses. Used condoms scattered in
open rubbish piles can be seen. These women were scared that this type of waste
was more dangerous as it exposed children scavengers to the risk of infection of
HIV/AIDS.
Moreover, information from key informants and household case study is replete
with statements from communities, expressing how uncollected solid waste was
responsible for waterborne and vector-borne diseases experienced by them. In
all the study streets rubbish represented by uncollected solid waste was identified
as a risk to livelihoods and well-being.
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Table 6: Ranking of Common Risks to Well-being and Livelihoods
Street Clean Water Solid Waste Health/Disease Unemployment
1234ufaraB
234ituraB
1234adnawihC
Gongo la Mboto 4 3 2 1
34asirdI
2341awgurubiK
Misheni-Mburahati
432egudnukM
4231ogoM
2143irsisisM
4312inagnotM
Mwongozo-Makuburi 4 2 3
423iruzU
1234inewbijiV
1243akutiV obmoY
71230434erocS
DCBAknaR
Key: 4=Most important; 1=Least important
Information presented in this section reveals that concessionaire provided refuse
collection services by the DCC has had minimal impact in extending the service
to the urban poor of Dar es Salaam. Using different impact assessment indicators,
the study findings show that the service is only available on regular basis to only
three of the sixteen study streets. In the remaining thirteen streets, the service
was either irregular or short lived because majority of service providers have
withdrawn their services. The study has further revealed that the majority of
residents in the thirteen streets rely on informal refuse collection and disposal
methods. With regard to living environment, the findings show that the living
environment (poor sanitation, scattered solid waste, filthy conditions) has not
improved. The study further reveals that the communities in the study streets
perceive refuse collection service as an important response to the health problems
caused by scattered and uncollected solid waste.
3.3 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR POOR PERFORMANCE
What factors are responsible for the minimal impact of concession privatisation
in providing the urban poor with the service?
Respondents from the sixteen assessed streets identified a number of factors
contributing to dismal performance of concession privatisation of refuse collection
services strategy in providing the urban poor with access to refuse collection
service. These include: weakness in the institutional and organisational capacity
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of both DCC and concessionaires, lack of involvement of communities in the
decision making and implementation of the strategy, mistrust on DCC and
concessionaire by communities and poor infrastructure. Detailed account of
quotation from the study corresponding to these factors is presented in Annex 3.
3.3.1 Lack of Involvement of Communities in Decision-making and
Implementation of Concession Privatisation
We have argued in this paper that, involvement of service recipient in the decision-
making and implementation is critical for concession privatisation to achieve the
intended outcomes. This involvement is achieved through giving the service recipient
direct legal rights and obligations in the whole process of decision-making and
implementation. This imposes self-regulation on the recipients’ part thus lowering
enforcement costs and consequently making the service accessible to the low-
income households. There are different ways in which such delegation can be
achieved including transferring responsibilities for determining the process, plan
and implementation to the targeted population through their own institutions. In
practical sense, delegation of direct rights and legal obligations would mean
allowing service recipient i.e. service purchaser the freedom to decide and enforce
compliance on their decisions. Delegation of rights and obligations to service
recipient, promotes self-regulation because it installs sense of community and duty
on the service recipient (Boulding, 1990, p.25).
Research findings underscore the linkage between delegating direct rights and
responsibilities to service recipient and the success of concessionaire privatisation
in providing the urban poor with refuse collection service. It became apparent
from the study that DCC failure to delegate direct legal rights and responsibilities
to service recipient contributed to its dismal performance. The DCC did not
delegate direct legal rights and obligation to the service users but instead, relied
on use of legal action to secure compliance from service recipient. Consequently,
the service recipient felt alienated and responded by not being co operative. A
quote from Madenge explains this well, “Sisi ndiyo tunaojua swala la uchafu
na nini kifanyike. Sasa mtu atoke huko bila kusaidiana na mimi hawezi
kufanikiwa, miradi yao hiyo ya mezani, wameipanga halafu wanatuletea huku,
siyo rahisi kuikubali.” Key informant interview, Street Chair” [We are the ones
who know better and about the problem of uncleanliness and what is to be
done. If someone comes here from wherever he does without my involvement,
he cannot succeed. Their table planned projects, they plan them somewhere
else, then impose them on us, we cannot accept them easily].The service
purchasers’ exit is exhibited by refusal to pay as well as collaboration with the
concessionaire. Irrational behaviours of communities such as dumping waste in
open spaces and drains are further indications of the recipients not being co
operative.
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Research findings further demonstrate that only a small proportion of the targeted
service recipients actually pay for the service. The proportion of households
paying for refuse collection services was as low as between 25 per cent and 30
per cent in all survey streets. For instance in Mogo, eligible paying houses are
1,280, however, only 30 houses are paying. The collected amount is thus far
below the amount required to meet service production costs. The problem of
refusal to pay collection fees by the urban poor was related to poor service
delivery by the concessionaire. The study findings show that the service recipients
in the sixteen study streets are willing to pay for the service only if they receive
value for money. A quote from Mwongozo explains the point: “Sisi tuko tayari
kulipia mradi tu huduma iwe bora na viwango viendane na uwezo wetu. Mbona
vijana wa viroba tunawalipa?” FGD Women, Mwongozo. [We are ready to pay
as long as the service is of good quality and the collection fees are consistent
with our capability. Apparently, we are paying the informal refuse collectors].
Failure to delegate rights and obligations to the service recipients by DCC was
not accidental but rather a result of an exclusionary and elitist approach adopted
in the designing of the privatisation strategy. As seen earlier, the EPM, which
was a framework for involving key stakeholders in decision-making on matters
relating to urban management, excluded local communities in the process.
Paradoxically, despite mentioning the involvement and vague role of communities
in the EPM, the local communities were never assigned any other responsibilities
except paying user fees (Majani, 2000, p.200; ILO, 2001). This lack of
involvement of communities in the conception stage, denied the DCC support
from the local community in the implementation of the strategy. Further the
consequences of not involving communities in EPM is underlined by Majani
(2000, p.203), who contends that households in Dar es Salaam are reluctant to
pay for refuse collection services for a number of reasons including lack of
involvement of households in the decision making process.
Lack of involvement of the local communities in the design of the contracting
out strategy, resulted into formulation of a strategy, which had serious flaws
that limited its potential in responding to refuse collection problems of low-
income areas of Dar es Salaam. The main flaws include: poor identification of
institutional capacity needs of the service providers operating in low income
areas; poor conception of the problems of solid waste management in low-
income areas of Dar es Salaam, the socio-economic characteristics of low income
areas and lack of thorough analysis of viability of a strategy during the planning
stage. DCC formulated the strategy that was incompatible with the reality in the
communities. For instance, while DCC set the refuse collection charge at TShs.
500 per household per month, the reality in the field forced service providers
concessionaire to change it to TShs 500 per house (each house containing 7
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households) per month. This amount represents a negotiated agreement between
concessionaire and service purchasers.
Another factor responsible for the dismal performance of concession privatisation
relates to institutional capacity of service providers operating in the low-income
areas. Findings from this research show that irregularity of service was mainly a
result of lack of equipments, trained staff and finances. A quote from HCS in
Msisiri street echos the point: “Yupo mkandarasi ambaye kipindi fulani alianza
kufanya kazi lakini baadae akakwama kutokana na kutokuwa na vifaa.” [There
is a service provider who at certain time started providing the service, but later
stopped because of lack of equipments]. It is thus evident that higher institutional
capacities in terms of finances and organisation is required for a service provider
to deal with the waste effectively with low capacity institutions. A quote from
Mkunduge tells it all: “Tazama hizo taka, wapika chips kibao, mama ntilie tele,
wee unafikiri taka hii kweli itamalizwa na mkokoteni”. [Look at the amount of
garbage! With so many chips and food vendors, do yo think this problems will
ever be solved with push carts? - KI Mkunduge]. The amount of solid waste
generated in low-income areas is higher than that generated in high income and
central business areas. For instance, Buguruni ward, a low-income area with an
area of 6.2 Km2 and a population of 127,305 persons, generates 112-kilograms
per capital waste per year. Accordingly, the daily capacity requirement for
removing this amount of waste from the area is 8 (eight) trucks of 6 to 8 m3
volume (Ilala Municipal Council, 2001). The research findings show that none
of the service providers involved in the assessment streets possessed such
equipments or finances to hire this number of trucks. To provide solid waste
collection and disposal service to the level required, a service provider operating
in Buguruni Madenge would need to carry at least 2-3 trips a day. At TShs.
25,000 per day per trip to hire a 7 (seven) ton truck, the service provider would
have to pay TShs. 75,000 per day. This amount is substantial compared to the
monthly collection fees of the service provider.
The type of waste generated in low-income areas is of low quality and cannot
attract scavengers. Secondary data shows that scavengers play a great role in
reducing collection load of refuse generated in high income and central business
areas. As shown in Table 7 the type of solid waste generated in low-income
areas include plastic bags, food remains, hard paper, bottles and cans. This type
of waste tends to be heavy and hardly attracts the interests of scavengers making
collection load for refuse collection in low-income areas higher than that of
high-income areas. This type of refuse generated requires high technology and
high institutional capacity on the part of the service providers.
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Table 7: Distribution of Type of Solid Waste Generated by Street
Street Socio-economic Status Dominant Type of Waste Generated
Barafu
Kimara-Baruti
sgab citsalp ,retaw diuqiL)akidnaT( adnawihC
Gongo la Mboto
Idrisa Plastic bags, used condoms, syringes, bottles,
food remains, hard papers
,srepap ,selttob ,sksuh tunococ ,stekcap kliMawgurubiK
food remains and used condoms
Misheni-Mbagala Poor Food remains, plastic bags
Mkunduge Poor/mixed Food remains, plastic bags, used condoms
Mogo/Kiwalani Poor, low income Charcoal ashes/food remnants, empty
people containers, plastic bags, drugs, syringes,
bottles and papers
Msisiri Plastic bottles, plastic bags [kondomu], cans
sniamer doof ,sgab citsalPinagnotM
sniamer doof dna selttob ,sgab citsalPirubukaM-ozognowM
smodnoc desu dna ,selttob ,sgab citsalPiruzU
Vijibweni Poor Solid waste, plastic bags, food remnants
Yombo Vituka Poor Paper, plastic bags
Source: Author’s compilation
3.3.2 Poor Conceptualisation of Problems of Solid Waste
Management of Low Income Areas of Dar es Salaam
At the conceptual level, problems of solid waste management in low-income
areas of Dar es Salaam were equated with those of high income and central
business areas. Both (ILO, 2001) and (Majani, 2001) demonstrate how the same
plan and approach used to introduce concessionaire refuse collection services to
high income and central business areas were extended to low income areas
without due regard of circumstances found in these areas. As demonstrated in
this study, problems of refuse collection in low-income areas are multifaceted
and are influenced by demographic and the socio-economic conditions obtained
in these areas. Lack of thorough analysis of the impact of these factors on the
strategy contributed to the dismal performance of the strategy.
The working group for solid waste management as well as the DCC made several
assumptions concerning low-income areas of Dar es Salaam. For instance there
was a strong belief that the low-income areas of Dar es Salaam contained a
sizeable proportion of medium and high-income households necessary for cross
subsidisation of service provision. Research findings demonstrate that there is a
small proportion of medium and high-income households in these areas. Another
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assumption was that the multitude of businesses in these areas would provide
the service providers with adequate revenue to subsidise service provision to
low-income households. A uniform rate of refuse collection was set for different
categories of business by DCC (Table 8). Contrary to DCC’s expectations, the
type of businesses operating in these areas generates very low incomes that can
hardly pay the refuse collection fees set by DCC. A quote from Kimangale, a
service provider serving in Temeke summarises this:“Ukiangalia biashara zenyewe
unajiuliza hawa watu walitumia vigezo gani kupanga bei hizi? Hivi vibiashara
havitoi ziada kubwa ya kuweza kulipia viwango vikubwa vya uzoaji taka kama
vilivyowekwa na manispaa. Pili kuna kodi nyingi sana hawa wenye biashara
wadogowadogo wanapaswa walipe”. [The type of businesses operating in these
areas do not yield much surplus to enable operators pay the high refuse collection
fees set by the DCC. When you look at the businesses you wonder how the
DCC arrived at these rates. Moreover, there are many other taxes that these
small operators are required,” Temeke, Kimangale Enterprise, FGD with service
providers]. Similar views were expressed by UASU a service provider for Mogo
street, “Unapokwenda kuongea na mfanyabiashara na wewe unaangalia hali,
maana sisi pia ni wenyeji wa hapa na tunajuana”. [When you go out to collect
the fees from the small business operations, you have to consider the actual
situation, for we are also residents in this same stree, we know each other].
Thus, business operators were failing to pay fees set by the DCC because they
were unattainable. Consequently, service providers and business operators
negotiated for fees lower than those set by DCC (Table 8). Even with negotiated
rates, the service providers were collecting less than 25 per cent of the negotiated
collection fees (Table 9). For instance a service provider in Manzese Uzuri, one
of the streets with a large business/service sector than all the other assessment
streets was able to collect only 7.1 (TShs. 205,000) per cent of the expected
revenues (i.e. TShs 2.8 million) from businesses. It was evident from the research
findings that several factors including poor environmental conditions contributed
to weaknesses of the businesses operating in these areas.
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Table 8: Summary of Planned and Actual Refuse Collection Fees Paid by
Businesses in Low-Income Areas
Type of Business DCC Set Fee TShs Monthly Actual/negotiated Fees Paid
000,5000,01esuoh tseuG
000,5000,01)etsaw citsemod( yrasnepsiD
Furniture making 25,000 (same as for 5,000
high income area)
General workshops 10,000 (same as in 3500-4000
high income area)
0004-0052000,01)lareneg( spohs elas elohW
)ogoM( 0003-0052000,5rehto dna doof( spohs liateR
items)
)ogoM( 0003-0052000,5rehto( spohs liateR
commodities without
VAT registration)
000,5000,01seirecorG
000,5 ;)ogoM( 005,2000,01raB
(Madenge); 5,000 (Makuburi)
0003-0052000,5rehctuB
)inehsiM( 000,3000,01ycamrahP
Markets 15,000 per trip (same 3,500
as in medium and
high income area)
Stalls (magenge) 2,000 per table (same 500
as in medium and
high income area)
Food vendor (mama ntilie) 500 (same as in
income area) 100
0003-0052000,01)desnecil( noolas gnisserd riaH
0001-005000,2)desnecil( roliaT
Kerosene stations 5,000 (same as in
medium and high
income area) 2500
0001-005000,2serots laocrahC
Source: Compiled by the author from different sources, Dar es Salaam City Commission, Refuse
Collection Charge Rates, 1999; Field data February-June 2001
Other assumptions relate to lack of appreciation of the role of the informal
refuse management system(s) existent in these areas during the strategy design
stage. The role of the informal refuse management systems was ignored from
the preparation stages when a baseline survey on the refuse management status
was conducted by JICA. In the baseline information report the role of the informal
sector is mentioned but in passing and no effort was made to study existent
systems and determine their place in the proposed intervention which was a
serious omission in the JICA report. This study found that the informal refuse
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management systems play an important role in the low-income areas. The
omission thus meant that the role of informal refuse management systems was
not recognised by the DCC despite their presence on the ground and as such, no
attempts were made by the DCC to harmonise the working relationship of the
two systems leading to conflict over domain control between informal and formal
service providers.
The formal system has been perceived by both the actors in the informal refuse
management system and their clients as an intrusion and violation of a social
system that has found legitimacy in the communities. A quote from Kiburugwa
echos the point: “Sisi tulifikiri mkandarasi anakuja kuongezea nguvu kwenye
uzoaji taka, matokeo tunaona anafanya kazi zilizokuwa zikifanywa na wenyeji,”
FGD, mixed group. [We thought the contractor was coming to compliment our
efforts in refuse collection, to the contrary he is doing the work that was being
done by the community members]. Such perceptions have made the formal refuse
management systems unpopular compared to the informal refuse management
systems. In almost all study streets where the concessionaires was not from within
the street, the service provider failed to sustain social trust, as the community
members perceive them as an imposition from the municipal authorities. This
lack of trust on concessionaire was echoed in all streets except in Mogo and
Kimara Baruti where the concessionaires are from within. A quote from
Kiburugwa summarises the communities’ expectations from the strategy as well
as their perception of service providers: “Manispaa wanapotoa tenda waanze
kwanza kuwasiliana na ofisi za mitaa kwa sababu sisi vijana tulioko huku mitaani
inaweza kutusaidia hata kujipatia ajira. Siyo kama hivi, watu wanatoka pengine
Kinonodni au wapi sijui.”  [The municipal authorities should consult us before
it gives out tenders. This is because we, the youth residing in this street, could
get employment from the DCC. It should not be the way it is now where
contractors are brought in from Kinondoni or other places were we do not
know,” FGD, and mixed group].
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Table 9: Type of Business Activities, Expected and Actual Fee Paying Entities
Economic Activity Quantity Expected Number Actual
Revenues Paying revenues
per Month
Shops (food &others) 66 2,640,000 20 80,000
000,93000,6321seicamrahP
005,751000,5103sllatS
005,13000,48sksoiK
000,55000,5151sroliaT
005,73000,516srehctuB
000,501000,5103spihc ayv outiV
000,5201000,5481snoolas riaH
Sawing mills (25,000 per month) 4 20,000 4 20,000
005,21005,73spohs elas elohW
000,012000,012yrenoitatS
Hardware shop (25,000 per month) 3 15,000 2 10,000
Furniture making workshops 8 20,000 5 12,500
000,014000,5201stnaruatseR
005,502005,288,2latoT
Source: Author’s compilation
3.3.3 Weakness of Concession Method of Privatisation
As seen in the literature review, concession as a method of privatising refuse
collection and disposal services has fundamental weaknesses that limit its potential
to generate intended outcomes. One of the weaknesses is monopoly that a
concession gives to the service provider (agent). The monopoly denies service
users freedom of choice necessary to stimulate competition and consequently
efficient working operations. The study findings lend support to the problems
of monopoly accorded to private providers. Under the current concession
arrangement, a single service provider is given concession to provide service to
all streets in a ward. For instance Monoko Enterprise who was to provide service
in Manzese was to cover five streets of different area coverage. This means that
the service users had to keep up with the service provider despite the quality of
service provided. As it happened with Uzuri and Mkunduge streets, in 1999
Monoko failed to secure agreement with communities on service charge rates
and withdrew the service from the area. Since then the two streets have never
had a replacement concessionaire service provider. It should be noted, however,
that the effects of Monoko’s withdrawal are not much felt because the informal
service providers somehow fill in the gap.
Another weakness is the advanced capacity required on the part of service
provider to meet clients’ expectations. Research findings reveal that none of the
service providers interviewed in this study had the level of capacity required to
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meet contractual obligations (Table 10). Of the 7 (seven) concessionaires
interviewed in this study only one (MPECO) had the required capacity in terms
of equipments and organisational set-up to meet the demands of the area allocated
to them. All the remaining concessionaires rely on hired equipments, which
tend to make their service production costs higher than the revenues collected.
Even for concessionaires with relatively high institutional capacity such as
MPECO, are able to sustain their activities from other sources including direct
transfers (payments) from municipal authorities for provision of other services
such as street cleaning.
Table 10: Summary of Capacity Indicators of Select Concessionaires
Categorisation Equipments Own Hire Staff Other Streets House-
activities served holds
Kimangale Private 2 trucks 11 ** 4
0005)ebmo’gnahC( )sennot 7(ynapmoC
6 pushcarts
UASU CBO 1 trailer 6-20* ** 4500
(1999)
PEGRO Private
Company
CVK CBO
MAWEMA CBO Trucks
(1997)
00076*12strachsuPCFA
MPECO Private 6 (7ton 20 *** ** Ilala-only 2
company trucks) 80* are low income 8000
2 tractors
4 other cars
12 pushcarts
5 trailers
KIWODET CBO 7 Pushcarts 21++ 2 8760
(1998) 4 W/barrow
6 spades,
6 rakes,
6 hoes
Key:
* Labourers, ** Clearing Street, ***Permanent, ++Members
Source: Compiled by the author from FGD interviews with contractors
The Income and Expenditure Summary of two concessionaires, provided in Table
11, show financial problems experienced by them. Information presented in
Table 11, reveals that MAWEMA’s income from collection charges is less than
what the CBO needs for delivery of better services. This explains the decision to
opt for irregular services as a way of reducing costs of service delivery.
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Table 11: Income and Expenditure Summary of Select Concessionaires
(MAWEMA)
Total houses to be served Rate TShs Income TShs
000,067,800010678
000,091,200010912latot fo %52
house to be
Served
Expenditure
Hiring of vehicle 2 trips per day x 6 streets 30,000 2,880,000
x 2 times a week x 4 per
month
Dumping fees 2 trips day x 6 streetsx 800
2 times a week x 4 per
008,67htnom
Labourers 21 labourers x 30 days 1,000 630,000
008,685,3erutidnepxE latoT
Source: Compiled by the author from FGD interviews with contractors
3.3.4 Weakness in Institutional Capacity of Delegating Authority
Another critical factor for success of concession privatisation, relates to the
capacity of the delegating authority (i.e. principal) to enforce contractual
obligations. Research findings show that, weak institutional capacity of DCC
(principal) contributed to the dismal performance of privatisation in providing
the urban poor of Dar es Salaam with this essential service. Specifically five
elements of institutional capacity are discussed including resources, organisational
structures, legal framework, management processes and policy.
3.3.4.1 Financial and Human Resources
This study has revealed that the Dar es Salaam City Council and its municipal
councils are not adequately resourced to enforce contractual obligations such as
monitoring of the performance of concessionaire, raising public awareness and
enforcing the law relating to payment of refuse collection charges. Indication of
weak institutional capacity (i.e. equipments) experienced by municipal authorities
of Dar es Salaam is presented in Table 12. The extent of weak resource base of
municipal authorities is demonstrated by the situation in Temeke. The department
of solid waste management in Temeke Municipal council receives only 20 per
cent of the municipals’ budget (recurrent) shared between health, solid and liquid
waste services. The department has seven technical personnel, eight trucks and
one car, motorcycles and radio calls. These resources constitute a very small
fraction compared to the area and the population to be served. The department
serves an area of 109.6 km2 spread across 67 streets. The seven technical staff of
Temeke municipal authority is inadequate to effectively supervise and monitor
activities of concessionaire who provided service (JICA, 1996, pp.1-27). Apart
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from supervision functions, the solid waste department of the Temeke municipal
has responsibility to provide directly through its own budget and staff refuse
collection services to more that 50 per cent of its total area. The council directly
collects 58 per cent of the total waste generated in the area (Temeke Council,
2000). Problems of financial and human resources are not limited to Temeke
alone  municipal but are also experienced by other municipal councils.
Weak resource base experienced by the three municipal councils has rendered
them ineffective in supervising the service providers as well as meeting other
contractual obligations. Discussions with solid waste management officials in
Temeke showed that patrol activities were not done enough because of lack of
resources. Inadequate supervision and monitoring of concessionaire by the DCC
was identified by respondents in all study streets as one of the factors contributing
to poor quality service. In all streets, community members did not know which
institution(s) was responsible for monitoring the activities of service providers.
The officials in Ilala, further, cited lack of finances as the major factor constraining
them from carrying out patrol as well as awareness creation campaigns.
Inadequate financial resources experienced by three municipal councils of Dar
es Salaam has hindered them from providing service providers with incentives
to promote and reinforce desired behaviours. Availability of financial incentives
such as credit and subsidies offered to service providers targeting low-income
areas is essential if the privatisation strategy is to be successful. The absence of
financial incentives such as credit and subsidy as is the case with Dar es Salaam
City Councils has compounded institutional capacity problems of service
providers. The service providers (concessionaires) demonstrated a need for credit
and subsidy from the contracting authorities. Indeed the success of UASU, a
CBO providing services at Mogo Street, was facilitated by an institutional support
it obtained from the Ilala municipal authority. The Ilala municipal council
accorded UASU subsidy to facilitate transportation of waste to dumping area at
Vingunguti. A subsidised price of TShs 7000 per trip compared to the market
rate of between TShs 25,000 and 30,000 enables UASU to collect for disposal a
large proportion of refuse generated in the area. More support to UASU was
given in form of contract that involved transfer of payments from the municipal
authority to the service provider. In this respect UASU was given a street cleaning
contract, which was paid for by the Ilala Municipal Council. It should be noted
that the decision by DCC to accord UASU subsidy was motivated by political
factors rather than concern for community’s well-being. The streets served by
UASU are adjacent to the main road to Dar es Salaam International Airport.
Visibility of such streets makes them critical for the image of the city.
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Table 12: Summary Information on Some Capacity Indicators of the Three
Municipal Authorities in Dar es Salaam
Municipal Area Km2 Population Wards Streets Number Staff Equipment
1996 Contractors
Temeke 109.6 577510 11 67 9 7 8 trucks
1 car
Ilala 93.7 477353 5 20 5 83 6 Dumpsite trucks
2 tractors
1 compactor
6 trailers
1 patrol car
Kinondoni 236.8 1128001 22 89 4,837 29* 5 trucks
1 car
Radio calls
Source: Compiled by the author from information obtained from interviews with officials of
solid waste departments of Temeke, Kinondoni and Ilala.
*Includes health officers of each ward
3.3.4.2 Weak Legal Framework
Absence of an enabling legal framework was cited as another factor contributing
to poor performance of service providers. Discussions with service providers
(concessionaires) cited municipal councils’ failure to enact and enforce by laws
on refuse collection charges as the major factor preventing them from getting
communities support in respect to fee payment. A quote from an FGD interview
with service providers explains:“Udhaifu wa Manispaa katika kutunga sheria
ya malipo, unawapa jeuri wananchi wasiotaka kuchangia malipo, wengi wa
wasiolipa ni wale wanaojua kuwa hakuna sheria ya kuwabana”. [Weakness of
the DCC in passing by laws on payment of refuse collection fees, has been
exploited by residents who refuse to pay service hte fee, the majority of those
who do not pay are aware of the legal loop-hole].
3.3.4.3 Organisational Structure and Work Practices
Institutional and organisational arrangements of the Dar es Salaam City Council
have been identified as critical factors contributing to weak financial base of the
municipal authorities. The organisational structures and work practices of the
Dar es Salaam City Council are not supportive of the concession privatisation
strategy because it places responsibilities for enforcement of contractual
obligations at higher levels of the local government hierarchy. The higher levels
are not only removed from where action is but suffer serious problems of resource
shortage. This centralisation tendency has made the DCC ineffective in enforcing
its contractual obligations. In the organisation structure of DCC, the division of
power, authority and responsibilities between the four tiers is such that, the
DCC, which is the highest body, has power to raise revenue and to coordinate
and oversee activities of all other tiers. The municipal council, which is the
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second tier, also has power to raise certain types of revenue, and coordinates
activities of all implementing agents in its area of jurisdiction.
A ward is the third level,  it is the administrative link between the municipal
council and the street governments, the implementing agents in the DCC
organisational hierarchy. A ward is managed by a ward development committee
comprising all street leaders and chaired by a councillor of the respective ward.
The ward executive officer is an extension staff of the municipal council and
secretary to the ward development committee responsible for implementing
councils’ decisions in all streets in the ward. A street government is the fourth
and lowest level in the hierarchy. It is the actual implementation body and is
responsible for maintaining peace and order in the street, relay government
policies pass on directives to the communities, maintains record of street residents
and handling complaints and resolve conflicts at the street level. The DCC, the
municipal council and as the street government are elected bodies. There is another
tier, which although not recognised by the Local Government Amended Act of
1999, continues to play a pivotal role of acting as a channel for organising
community action in the governance system of Tanzania. This is the ten cell unit
consisting 10 households (ten-cell unit), each with its own elected leader (balozi
wa shina), and with between 60-120 people in each group. However, since the
ten-cell unit is a structure of the ruling party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi), its
importance diminishes in areas where the ruling party does not have a strong
hold.
The above organisational structure of the DCC has several weaknesses. These
limit its effectiveness in providing an enabling framework for a pro-poor
privatisation strategy. The most critical weakness in the organisational structure
of the DCC is the omission of the street government from its organogram. This
is a serious anomaly when it comes to resource allocation. Since the organogram
is a framework for allocation of organisation’s resource and planning of activities,
non-inclusion of the street governments from the organogram of the Dar es
Salaam City Council has meant exclusion from the City Councils’ plans and
budget. Information on distribution of Dar es Salaam City Council budget among
its various hierarchical levels was not available making it difficult to make any
meaningful conclusions. However, chairperson of street governments of all sixteen
assessment streets confirmed that they did not have budgets allocated to them.
Furthermore, there is some level of duplication of functions between the two
higher tiers, DCC and municipal council, especially in the area of tax collection.
From the perspective of the taxpayer, this is double taxation and an exploitative
system that generates hatred towards the government. While in principle the tax
sources for the DCC are different from those of the municipal councils, the
targeted taxpayer is the same. The issue of double and multiple taxes was noted
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as one of the major cause for non-payment of refuse collection charges by
communities in all the sixteen streets. A quote from Mogo street, underscores
the point “Tatizo la uchafu hapa sokoni ni mikodi mingi na matumizi mabaya
ya fedha tunazotoa. Wakandarasi walikuja tukakataa kutoa hela kwa sababu
kila siku tunatoa  shilingi mia (100) city ambayo zamani walikuwa wanasema
hiyo hela ni kwa ajili ya kufagia, kuzoa taka na huduma za vyoo. Sasa mkandarasi
anasema anakusanya kwa niaba ya manispaa tutalipa kodi ngapi? Mama ee
zamani za mkoloni tulilipa kodi moja tuu ya kichwa na huduma ilikuwa
bwelele,” FGD men Market Operators. [Too many taxes and misuse of the
money we pay are the major factors contributing to problems of solid waste in
this market. Concessionaires came and we refused to pay collection fees because
we have been paying TShs. 100 per day, which initially they claimed, was for
market cleaning, refuse collection and toilets. Now the service provider is saying
s/he is collecting on behalf of the municipal council, how many taxes are we
going to pay? Mom, during colonial period we used to pay only one tax (head
tax) and the services were many]. Service providers associated double taxation
with poor performance of businesses in regards to payment of refuse collection
charges. It was highlighted during focus group discussions with service providers
in Temeke municipal council that a business proprietor in Temeke municipal
council has to pay more than six different taxes, these include: business license
fee, city service levy, income tax, refuse collection levy, sales tax and insurance
service levy. It was pointed out that too many taxes reduced peoples’ willingness
to pay any new taxes such as refuse collection charges.
Another weakness of the organisational structure of the DCC is the extent of
centralisation of authority over decision-making and finances. The case of
management of solid waste helps to illustrate the point. Although each of the
three municipal councils of Dar es Salaam have their own solid waste management
department, authority over decisions relating to financing of solid waste
management is retained by the Dar es Salaam City Council. Also, donor support
such as ILO training programme for concessionaires and UNDP capacity building
programmes are managed by the DCC. During focus group discussions with
service providers they indicated that they were getting support from DCC and
not the municipal councils.
The same tendency towards centralisation is reflected in the relationship between
municipal council and its lower tiers, ward and street governments. Results
from this study reveal that the municipal council is running the show. Focus
group discussions with ward executive officers reiterated the point that they do
not have any role to play in the management of concessionaires. For instance,
the majority of chairpersons of street governments were also not aware of the
presence of concessionaires in their areas of jurisdiction. This centralisation of
solid waste management responsibilities by the municipal council has rendered
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it ineffective in supervising and monitoring the performance of concessionaires.
It has also alienated street governments from activities of the concessionaires
because they consider them an imposition by the central administration of the
municipal council. A quote from the chairperson of Madenge street government
summarises: “Sisi ndiyo tunaowajua hawa wananchi, sasa mtu atoke huko bila
kusaidiana na mimi hawezi kufanikiwa” [We are the ones who know people
here, success of any intervention brought in this area will require my assistance.
Without my involvement nothing will succeed]. Clearly, lack of support from
street chairperson has contributed to poor performance by the service providers
specifically in fee collection. From the study findings, relatively good performance
in service provision can be observed in those streets where there is close working
relationship between the service provider and the street chairpersons as in Mogo.
This section has identified factors responsible for the minimal impact of
concession privatisation in providing the urban poor with refuse collection
service. From the users’ perspective the factors include: irregularity of the service,
unethical behaviour of service providers, lack of trust in service providers by
community members to mention a few. The factors identified by users were
analysed using the conceptual framework presented in the literature review. Three
major interrelated factors are responsible for the minimal impact of contracting
out refuse collection services in providing the urban poor with the service.  These
include: the absence of delegation of direct rights and legal obligations to the
service recipient; and weak institutional and organisational capacity of both the
contracting authority and the concessionaire method of privatisation.
These factors are presented in summary in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Cause and Effect of Minimal Performance of Contracting Out
Providing Urban Poor with Refuse Collection Service
Poverty
Diseases/inability to work or attend school
Poor service (irregular, unethical  behaviour, withdrawal,  dumping, scattered waste)
Lack of community support/refusal to pay collection fees/conflict between concessinaries and informal providers
Formulation of flawed strategy/not informed by local knowledge
Service purchaser exit from service
Lack of delegation of direct rights and legal obligations to service purchaser
Centralisation of decision-making/ monitoring/enforcement roles and resources at DCC and Municipal council
Weakness of concession privatisation in delivering pro poor policies
Weak institutional and organisational capacity
Inadequate access to concession provided refuse collection service by urban poor of low-
income areas of Dar es Salaam
Poor performance of contracting out in providing low-income 
households of Dar es Salaam with refuse collection service
Poor and unhygienic Habitat (Scattered waste, blocked drains, filthy, stinking smell, unsanitary conditions)
Infected flooded water seep into water sources, flooded, washed to residences
Waterborne and airborne diseases (cholera, diarrhoea, giardia, malaria, tuberculosis, bronchitis)
Ban on livelihoods activities & Inability to work or attend school
Poverty
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3.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE SITUATION
What needs to be done to mitigate those factors responsible for minimal
performance of concession privatisation in providing lurban poor access to this
social service?
Several recommendations were given by respondents to make the strategy work
as raised in the analysis. The recommendations are summarised as follows:
3.4.1 Reorganisation of DCC
As was found in this study the current structure of the DCC is embedded with
duplication of roles and responsibilities between the two higher tiers, the DCC
and the municipal council. Both the DCC and municipal councils have mandates
to collect taxes and service charges from the same sources. During the assessment
period, municipal officials complained of unequal distribution of taxation
responsibility between DCC and municipal councils as well as between DCC
and the central government. They argued that the large majority of taxes allocated
to municipal councils are of minor yield, and cost-ineffective in collection and a
source of irritation to tax payers. Secondary data further suggests that municipal
councils are responsible for administration of less than 20 per cent of the total
of 60 different revenue sources allocated to the DCC (Ndibalema et al, 2001).
The Ministry of Finance made the same observation in 1996 (MoF, 1996, p.88).
What is required, therefore, is to revisit the structure and harmonise roles and
responsibilities of the two tiers to remove duplication. Moreover, the DCC seems
to have an overly control over donor resources earmarked for solid waste
management. Further research is needed to examine the prospects and problems
of a four-tier structure as it relates to the implementation of the pro-poor policies
such as urban environmental management.
3.4.2 Strengthening Role of Street Government in the DCC Structure
The street governments whose mandate is to implement the municipal council’s
policies, does not appear in the organisation structure of the DCC neither does
it have a budget. While it is true that the street government has a representation
in the ward development committee, the study findings show that this level is
the most uninformed tier of the DCC. Respondents in all streets, suggested for
an increased role of street governments and communities in the management of
solid waste services. The demands were made on the belief that street governments
and communities are more knowledgeable and competent to judge on what is
good for them. As to how this could be achieved, respondents proposed the
municipal council to establish a protocol of solid waste management and then
transfer its responsibilities for implementation including selection of
concessionaire and implementation to street governments and communities.
Increasing the role of street governments may not be a viable solution in streets
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where the residents are highly divided on political party ideologies as in
Kiburugwa. In such circumstances attempts could be made to identify and
strengthen those institutions that have social legitimacy (acceptance).
3.4.3 Framework for Policy Formulation
The study has shown that there were serious flaws in the institutional framework
and process by which the concession privatisation strategy was designed. The
EPM and the working group for solid waste management remain to be elitist
with little or no involvement with communities. A call was made for extending
direct rights and legal obligations to service recipients. Service recipients felt
that if they are asked to pay for the service they should be involved in decision-
making in matters relating to design and implementation of privatisation of
refuse collection services. Communities indicated that involvement of service
users in the design and implementation of contracting refuse collection strategy
was seen as essential for community’s acceptance of the obligations imposed on
them. Also community involvement was seen essential for community’s ownership
of the strategy and monitoring of the performance. Indeed, community
involvement was cited as a critical factor for good performance of concessionaire
(service provider) in Mogo Street. The working group model of the DCC may
not be sufficient for extending community involvement in decision-making and
implementation. At policy level, a multi-stakeholder working group for each
municipal council seems to be plausible. Local knowledge through participatory
processes could be harnessed to develop modalities by which municipal working
groups are to function.
3.4.4 Revisit the Concession Method of Privatisation
It is argued that the concession method of privatisation is viable in situations of
strong institutional capacity on both principal and agents. Neither the DCC nor
service providers have requisite institutional nor organisational capacities required
for this method of privatisation. Respondents suggested for a contract method,
that is, DCC pays a service provider) as a viable method of privatisation of
refuse collection services in Dar es Salaam. A quote from Kiburugwa helps to
echo the point “Jiji walipie gharama ya uzoaji taka kwani kodi ya maendeleo
tunalipa ya nini.” [DCC should pay for refuse collection service, what is the
purpose of the development levy that we pay?” FGD mixed group].
The idea of getting DCC directly financing solid waste services provision in low
income areas is a sound one given weaknesses of the present concession system.
However, for this to work it may require a reform of the financial relationship
between central and local government authorities. The local government
authorities of Tanzania are highly dependent on funding from the central
government. In doing so the central government has reserved for itself
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responsibility for collection and retention of revenues from high yield tax bases.
This has left local governments with very few, low yield and high administration
cost tax bases such as development levy, property tax and building permit tax.
A policy issue to address this situation requires reforming the financial
relationship between the DCC and the central government represented by the
Tanzania Revenue Authority.
It is important to note that the problems of solid waste management for low-
income areas of Dar es Salaam are complex and may require a combination of
strategies and institutional frameworks. These problems are compounded by
socio-economic and demographic conditions obtained in these areas. The system
of solid waste management relevant for low-income areas of Dar es Salaam
would have to address critical issues of, waste collection and disposal, cost
effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The study has shown that
there exists two systems, informal and formal, of waste management in low-
income areas of Dar es Salaam. At the moment the two systems are competing
instead of complementing each other. Recommendations from the sixteen streets
emphasise synergy between the two management systems. From the study findings
it is clear that the communities are proposing for a single chain of service delivery
system in which the households, informal service providers, formal service
providers as well as municipal authorities are networked into different forms of
partnerships (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Proposed Network of Solid Waste Management Service Delivery
h/h generators 
self regulation
Informal systems
Collect from h/h to 
collection points
Contractors from 
collection points 
to 
land fill
Street 
governments 
provide enabling 
framework 
locally
Municipal 
Council policy 
related enabling 
framework
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As was suggested from Mogo and Kiburugwa streets, the informal system could
be strengthened to address the problems of primary collection, that is, from
households to collection points), while contract method could be appropriate
for secondary collection, that is, from collection points to the official dumping
sites). With regard to informal systems, it was further suggested that emphasis
be placed on those methods, which rely on sustainable compliance enforcements
arrangements that foster community action.
4.0 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This research has revealed areas that need further research. It is thus recommended
that further research be carried in the following subjects:
• In-depth study into the social organisation of low-income areas and potential
for community action.
• Development and/or validation of existing indicators for assessing the impact
of privatisation in providing low-income households with refuse collection
services.
• Potential of participatory waste management strategy drawing lessons from
successful experiences in Tanzania or any other developing countries with
conditions similar to those obtained in Dar es Salaam.
• Problems and prospects of multiple layered organisation structures in
delivering pro-poor policies.
• Potential of local (street based) non-public institutions in facilitating
community action for sustainable solid waste management.
• Community involvement in decision making and implementation of workable
options for solid waste management
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ANNEXES
Annex 1: A Summary of Activities Carried Out in 16 Streets of Dar es Salaam
Street Case Focus Key
Study Group Informant
Households Discussions Interview Remarks
FIRST ROUND FIELD VISITS
Idrisa 4F 3M 2 (Women + Youths) WEO + SC
Uzuri 4F 2M 2 (Women + Men) WEO + SC
Barafu 3F 2M 2 (Women + CBO) SC
Baruti 5F 1M 2 (Women + Youths) WEO + SC
Mkunduge 4F 3M 2(Women + Men) WEO
Mwongozo 2F 1M 1 (Women) WEO + SC
Msisiri 2F 1M 1 (Youths) SC
Mtongani 3F 2M None SC The visit coincided with
another research which
started on a previous day
SECOND ROUND FIELD VISITS
Madenge 4F 2M 2 (Women + men) WEO + SC
Mogo 3F 3M 2 (Men + CBO) WEO + SC
Gongolamboto 4F 3M 2 (Women + Men) Street leader*
Misheni - - 1 (Men & WEO + SC The community insisted
Women together) that they should speak as
one
Kiburugwa 4F 3M 2 (Women + men) SC
Yombo 2F 1M 1 (Men &
Women together) SC
Chiwanda 5F 1M 2 (men + women) SC + Ward
treasurer
vijibweni 2F 1M 1 (Men & SC
Women together)
Key: F: Female; M: Male; WEO: Ward Executive Officer; SC: Street Chairperson.
NB: In all streets neighbourhood observation/guided transect walks were also carried out.
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SERVICE PROVIDERS
Three focus group discussions were carried out for service providers (one for
each municipality).
Temeke Kimangele, Pegro, Omari Madenga Co. Ltd.
Ilala UWASU, PMJ
Kinondoni KIWODET, MAWEMA (others showed up but declined to be
interviewed on service issues because the municipal authorities
had already re-advertised their positions).
MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES
Interviews/discussions were carried out with municipal personnel responsible
for supervising collection of solid waste. In all the three municipalities, the head
of the waste management department was interviewed.
Temeke: Mr. T. Lyimo
Ilala: Mr. S. Bubegwa
Kinondoni: Mr. K. Mvano
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Annex 2: Historical Mapping of Environmental Condition before and after
the Introduction of Contracting-out Refuse Collection Services
gnitcartnoc-tsoPgnitcartnoc-erP
Street 1960s –1970s 1980 – early 1990s 1996-2000
Idrisa Very clean: low Poor:  due to lack of Still poor in unplanned areas; better in
 population; planned capacity by the DCC; planned areas: operation of a contractor
 area; availabilityof increased population, for eight months, later, use of youths
service from the local  squarter areas,  and and family initiative.
government authority. increased production
of non-degradable waste.
Uzuri Very clean, no pollution: Very darty especially due Clean at the time when the contractor
refuse collection by to population increase and operated: now, very dirty due to absence
DCC. inadequate DCC services of waste collection services.
and  absence of local
dumping places.
Barafu No DCC service Clean: Not so clean:
in the area. population still low; increased population;  emergence of and
the areawas planned and congestion  in squarter areas;
availability of land lack of collection points  and
for  digging refuse pits. contractor operated only for six months.
Baruti Clean:  low population Clean:  a group  of Not clean: population increase;  the current
 and availability of  women provided the contractor has  a very poor coverage.
 areas for digging service in places like the
refuse pits.  markets and other
commercial  areas
Buguruni - There was no service. Dirty as population Extremely dirty: there is sometimes
;eef llams a ta sredivorp ecivres laudividni.desaercniegnedaM
there was a contractor whose service was
very poor and is now in a tension with the
municipal authorities in court.
Mkunduge Clean: each house had The area became dirty with Extremely dirty:  very high populations
dust-bins;  availability the growing population  and lack of refuse and waste collection
of areas for digging pits. and congestion of houses. sercives. The contractor  allocated to the
tnemeerga  on rof detarepo reven sah aeraebmo’gN ni retaw ehT
lacol eht htiw tsoc eht no dehcaer neeb sah.neht naelc saw reviR 
communities.
Msisiri The area was clean: Became dirty due to: Conditions are poor due to the irregularity
low population density population growth in the of service provision, that is, poor services by
and DCC services. area and increased  rate the contractor.
of poverty.
Mwongozo Clean because of: Fairly clean: Dirty because of:
low population density with an influx of more lack of adequate refuse collection services;
and  plenty of land for people, the level of population growth which is unproportional
digging pits. cleanliness deteriorated. to the services.
Mtongani No  information. Clean due to Some areas are fairly clean while others are
low population. not. the contractor has stopped providing
services.
Continues on the following page...
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gnitcartnoc-tsoPgnitcartnoc-erP
Street 1960s –1970s 1980 – early 1990s 1996-2000
Mogo No  information. Not very clean due to Clean: the contractor, UASU, has proved
increased influx of people to be efficient and has good working
and increased construction relationships with the local people
of houses. and the street government, hires youths
from the area.
Gongo la- Fairly good: due to Dirty: because Dirty except for areas adjusent to the road;
Mboto DCC services . the service stopped. cholera outbreaks are not uncommon in the
area.
Chiwanda Clean: Poor: When the contractor was operative,
DCC provided the DCC stopped the services; the area was clean, but since he withdrew
service. less space for rubbish pits. the place has become dirty.
Vijibweni
Mishieni-
Mburahati
Kiburugwa Clean due to free
services by Cesspit.
Mwongozo Clean: Clean due to city services Not vey clean: the service is no longer
Makuburi, less population density; and plenty of land for reliable; service mostly provided by
Yombo and adequate space for digging pits for refuse. individuals  at a small fee and sometimes
.sisab reetnulov a no.cte esufer gnipmud
The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services
47
Annex 3: Summary of Factors Contributing to the Dismal Performance of
Contracting Out Refuse Strategy in Improving Living Conditions
Institutional /Organi- Poor Design Community Involve- Infra- Service Respondent
Street sational Capacity of the ment in Deciding structure Coverage
among Contractors  Strategy Fees  and Mode of
Payment
Idrisa The contractor Irregularity No involvement. Accessible Planned CSH (Man)
had no working of service through areas CSH(Woman)
redael teertS.ylnotpecxe sdaorroop dnadeiler ,stnempiuqe
dennalpnu ni.gnidrocer.seno derih no FGD-Women
areas.
Uzuri No information Irregular No involvement. Most parts Services to FGD -Men
laicremmocton erasecivres
accessible, an areas and
unplanned high income
area.  earners.
Barafu Contractor does not No records, Involved in deciding A larger part Contractor FGD - Women
posses working equip- Irregular fees but not mode of is accessible collected Street leader
ments, relies on hiring. services. payment. by road. refuse from MBADECO
one collection CSH (Man)
point. Uses
youths to
collect from
households.
Baruti Inadequate trucks to Not regular. No involvement. Narrow Service to Ten-cell leader
laicremmoc.sdaormorf esufer tcelloc CSH-Woman
.ylno saera.stniop noitcelloc FGD-Women
Mkunduge Contractor never Not Not applicable. Established Not CSH-Woman
showed up in the area. applicable. road-network applicable. CSH - Man
most of it is Monica
covered by
petty-traders.
Msisiri Insufficient trucks and Not regular. No involvement. Accessible Each visit FGD-Youths
tnereffid agnirud yliam.sloot rehto
dry season. part is
covered.
M/ngozo Insufficient trucks Not regular. No involvement. Accessible Cover all FGD-Women
elbisseccani tpecxesloot rehto dna CSH-Woman
the rainy collection CSH-Man
season. points.
M/ngani Personnel are unethical, Irregular No involvement. Good Only part CSH-Woman
 fo.ytilibissecca.secivresevisuba esu yeht the whole CSH-Man
nwonk aeratneiciffusnI .egaugnal
working equipments. as Mtongani
Pwani.
Key:
CSH - Case Study Households;  FGD - Focus Group Discussion
M/ngozo - Mwongozo; M/ngani - Mtongani
48
The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services
REFERENCES
Armstrong, A. “Master Plan for Dar es Salaam, Tanzania” Habitat International.
11 (2): 1987, pp.133-145.
Bartone, C. et all. Toward Environmental Strategies for Cities: Policy
Considerations for Urban Environmental Management in
developing Countries, No. 18. Washington, D.C, World Bank,
1994.
Boulding, K. Three Faces of Power, Newbury Park, California DCC: Sage, 1990.
Chandler, J.A. Local Government Today, Manchester:, Manchester University
Press, 1996.
Christiansen, P. F. “Performance and Divestment of State-Owned Enterprises in
Ghana.” Public Administration and Development, 18(3), 1998,
pp.281-93.
Cohen, J. M. “Foreign Advisors and Capacity Building: The Case of Kenya,”
Public Administration and Development, 12(5), 1992, pp.493-
510.
Coffey, M. “Sustainable Cities Programme Report on Solid Waste management
Volume One Solid waste Collection,” unpublished report, 1992.
Cointreau-Levine, S. Private Sector Participation in Municipal Solid Waste services
in Developing Countries, Newbury Park, California:, Sage, 1994.
Dar es Salaam City Commission, ‘Mikakati ya Kuwahusisha Wananchi katika
Kutoa Huduma ya Uzoaji Takataka Na Usafi katika Jiji la Dar es
Salaam’, unpublished material, 1998.
————, “Orodha ya Wakandarasi wa Kuzoa Taka Kanda ya Kinondoni
Mpaka Tarehe 30 November,” Unpublished material, 1999.
————, “Vifaa Walivyonavyo Wakandarasi,” unpublished material, 2000.
Dia, M. “Africa’s Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous
and Transplanted Institutions.” Directions in Development,
Washington, D.C:, The World Bank, 1996.
Dietrich, M. “Transaction costs and Revenues” Transaction Costs, Markets and
Hierarchies in C, Pitelis (ed), Oxford, Blackwell, 1993.
Doan, P. “Institutionalising Household Waste Collection: The Urban
Environmental Management Project in Cote d’Ivoire”. Habitat
International. Vol. 22, No. 1, 1989, pp.27-39.
The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services
49
Fenwick, J. Managing Local Government,  London, Chapman and Hall, 1995.
Frankernberger, T.R. “Measuring Household Livelihood Security: An Approach
for Reducing Absolute Poverty,” Paper prepared for the Applied
Anthropology Meetings, March 27-30, 1996, Baltimore.
Gary, C. W., and M. D. McCubbins, “Structure and Policy: The Institutional
Determinants of Policy Outcomes,” Department of Political
Science, California:, University of San Diego, 1996.
Gordon, C. “A Framework for implementing Human Service Programmes: How
Hard Will It Be?,” Public Policy, 27:  1979, pp.387-435.
Hirschmann, D. “Institutional Development in the Era of Economic Policy
Reform: Concerns, Contradictions, and Illustrations from
Malawi,” Public Administration and Development, 13(2): 1993,
pp.113-28.
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), “The Study on the Solid Waste
Management for Dar es Salaam City in the United Republic of
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam:” Progress Report (2), Dar es Salaam
City Commission, August, 1996.
Kaare, S. K. “Public Policy Performance in Developing Countries: Urban Housing
Policy with Special Reference to the National Sites and Services
and Squatter Upgrading in Tanzania,” A Thesis submitted for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Canberra,
1998.
Kirango, S. “Senior Health Environmental Management Officer Dar es Salaam
City Commission,” Discussion held on Privatisation of Refuse
Collection by the Dar es Salaam City Commission, 2000.
Kironde, J. M. L. “The Governance of Waste Management in Africa Cities: The
case of Dar es Salaam,” Dar es Salaam:, Ardhi Institute, 1995.
Kizito, Nkwabi. Health Environmental Officer in the Solid and Liquid Waste,
and Pollution Control Unit, Dar es Salaam City Commission
‘Discussions held between Mr.  Kizito and the Principal Researcher,
1999.
Kombe, W, (ed), “Participatory Environmental Planning and Management: Is
SDP Making It?” in Kombe W and V. Kreibich, 1997, Decentralised
Development and Prospects for Planning in Africa, N.P., University
of Dortmund, 1997.
50
The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services
Kulaba, S. “Local Government and the Management of Urban Services in
Tanzania,” in R. Stren and R.R. White, (eds), African Cities in Crisis:
Managing Rapid Urban Growth, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
Lee, Y. “The Privatisation of Solid Waste Infrastructure and Services in Asia,”
Third World Planning Review, 19(2), 1997, pp.139-161.
Lifset R., and Fernandez L. “The Search for Best Practices in Urban Solid Waste
Management Services in Developing Countries”, Internet
Conference, 1997/1998. Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban
Environment. Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) 1998.
Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), “Reform Agenda,” unpublished
paper, Prime Ministers Office, Dar es Salaam 1998.
Lugalla, J. “The Social Context of Management of Environmental Pollution in
Dar es Salaam City in Tanzania,” A Research Report submitted to
the International Development Research Council (IDRC), 1996.
Magnus, C. “Managing the Sustainable Development of Dar es Salaam,” Solid
Waste Collection, Vol. I, UNCHS/SDP, Consultant’s Report, 1992.
Moore, M. “Good Government Introduction,” IDS Bulletin, Vol. 24(1), 1993,
pp.1-6.
Munishi, G. “Health Services Delivery in Tanzania: Some Qualitative Differences
Between Government and Non-Government Primary Health Care
Units,” Paper Presented at Seminar on State versus NGOs in
Provision of Services in Eastern Africa, 22-24 July, Dar es Salaam:
Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, 1992.
Mushi, S. S.; J, Semboja, and O. Therkildsen. “Issues of Service Provision in the
1990s in Eastern Africa,” Paper Presented at Seminar on State
versus NGOs in Provision of Services in Eastern Africa, 22-24
July, Dar es Salaam: Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar
es Salaam, 1992.
Ndibalema, N.; D. Constantine; L. Kajigili; T.P, Kaare; S.K., Luzunya and M.
Samia, “The Existing Financial Relationship between Central and
Local Government in Tanzania: Potential for Workable
Devolution,” unpublished essay for Public Administration Course,
Institute of Finance Management, 2001.
Ntukula, M. “Social Problems of Squatters: A Case Study of Kinondoni-Moscow
Dar es Salaam,” unpublished B.A Dissertation, University of Dar
es Salaam, 1984.
The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services
51
Ohnesgoren, F. “Sorting Out Waste” Public Management, 75, 1993, pp.9-12.
Olowu. D and P. Smoke, “Determinants of Success in African Local Governments:
An Overview,” Public Administration and Development 12(1):
1992, pp.1-17.
Palumbo, D.J, (ed), The Politics of Programme Evaluation, Newbury Park: Sage,
1987.
Post, J. “The Problems and Potentials of Privatising Solid Waste Management
in Kumasi, Ghana” Habitat International. Vol. 23, No. 2: 1999,
pp.201-215.
Preker, A.S., and Feachem, R. G. A, Market Mechanisms and the Health Sector
in Central and Eastern Europe, World Bank Technical Paper
Number 293, 1995.
SDP, Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project: Progress Report 1994, Dar es Salaam,
1994.
Self, P. Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice, Basingstoke:,
Macmillan Press Limited, 1993.
Semboja, J and N. S Therkildsen, Service Provision under Stress in East Africa:
The State, NGOs and People’s Organisations in Kenya, Tanzania
and Uganda, Copenhagen, Centre for Development Research, 1995.
Smale, M. and V.M. Ruttan, “Cultural Endowments, Institutional Renovation
and Technical Innovation: The Groupements NAAM of Yalenga,
Burkina Faso” Unpublished Paper, Economic Development Centre,
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1994.
Temeke Municipal Council, “Temeke Municipality and Contractors: Takataka
Tones Collected in 1999 and 2000”, unpublished material from
the Temeke Municipal Council’s, Solid Waste Department, 2002.
Therkildsen, O. “Primary Education and Local Government: Who Decides, Pays
and Benefits?” Paper prepared for the workshop on ‘Quality and
Equity Issues in Tanzanian Education Policy and Practice: Insights
from Research’. 15-16 December, Dar es Salaam, 1993.
UNDP. United Nations Development Programme,1992: The Urban Environment
in Developing Countries, New York:, UNDP, 1992.
UNDP. “Dar es Salaam City Council, Managing Sustainable Growth and
Development of Dar es Salaam,” UNDP and Habitat URT/90/
033,  1992.
52
The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services
UNHCS. Environmental Guidelines for Settlements Planning and Management:
Institutionalising Environmental Planning and Management for
Settlements Development: Nairobi:, United Nations Centre for
Human Settlements, 1987.
Walker, J; J. Vasant; G. Brantly and R. Johnson, “Private Participation in
Indonesia: Water Supply and Waste Management”, Urban India
12: 1992, pp.92-130.
W, and V. Kreibich, Decentralised Development and Prospects for Planning in
Africa, N.P., University of Dortmund, 1997.
World Bank. Focus on Poverty: A Report by the Task Force of the World Bank,
Washington DC: World Bank, 1985.
————. World Development Report, The State in a Changing World, New
York:, Oxford University Press, 1997.
World Bank, Better Urban Services: Finding the Right Incentives, Washington,
D. C: World Bank, 1995.
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons  
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs  3.0 Licence. 
 
 
 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
 
